Egri, Péter and Kis, Tamás (2017) Serial Dictatorship Mechanism for Project Scheduling with Non-Renewable Resources. Other. UNSPECIFIED. (Submitted)
|
Text
egri_kis_sds.pdf Download (653kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This paper considers a resource-constrained project scheduling problem with self-interested agents. A novel resource allocation model is presented and studied in a mechanism design setting without money. The novelties and specialties of our contribution include that the nonrenewable resources are supplied at different dates, the jobs requiring the resources are related with precedence relations, and the utilities of the agents are based on the tardiness values of their jobs. We modify a classical scheduling algorithm for implementing the Serial Dictatorship Mechanism, which is then proven to be truthful and Pareto-optimal. Furthermore, the properties of the social welfare are studied.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Other) |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Q Science / természettudomány > QA Mathematics / matematika > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science / számítástechnika, számítógéptudomány |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Tamás Kis |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Sep 2017 10:30 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Mar 2018 15:49 |
| URI: | http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/62594 |
Actions (login required)
 |
Edit Item |
