The Comparative Political Economy of Financial Crimes and Their Enforcement. The Case of Insider Trading

Győry, Csaba (2015) The Comparative Political Economy of Financial Crimes and Their Enforcement. The Case of Insider Trading. In: The Routledge Handbook of White-Collar and Corporate Crime in Europe. Routledge, London, pp. 453-471. ISBN 9780415722148

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Abstract

This chapter investigates the interconnectedness of financial crimes and the political economy of finance. It puts forward the argument that the political economy of an economic system is a crucial factor in determining how financial crimes are defined by law, which crimes are most likely to be more intensively enforced but also which financial crimes are most likely to be committed. It argues that financial crimes and their enforcement only “make sense” in a particular economic, legal and political setting. It further argues that this is not only true to the overall economic system, that is, whether it is based on a socialist or a capitalist logic, where the economic institutions protected by criminal law are fundamentally different, but also to different forms of capitalism.

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