Demeter, Attila and Ilyés, Szilárd (2017) A politikai filozófia és a "kiterjesztett gondolkodásmód" módszertani követelménye. KELLÉK (57). pp. 159-188. ISSN 1453-7400
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Abstract
In my paper, I tray to reflect on the methodological requirement of “enlarged mentality” as it was once described (shortly) by Hannah Arendt in her essays on The Crisis in Culture and Truth and Politics. According to Arendt, one cannot think about politics with scientific neutrality: not even the philosopher. This means that our political thinking never will be simply “true”, but, instead, it could be “representative”. For this reason, we should always try to transpose our existence where we are not and view the world through the eyes of those who look at it from a different angle. However difficult, perhaps this is not impossible after all. I also try to compare this ideal of political thinking with that of Leo Strauss’s and demonstrate that – though both were greatly influenced by classical political philosophy – the Arendt’s vision is much closer to the original, Aristotelian ideal than that of Strauss’s. This is mostly because for Strauss the Aristotelian form of political philosophy was nothing other than the fully conscious form of the common sense understanding of political things. In this way, Aristotle becomes for Strauss the founder of modern political science and this is precisely the reason why Strauss finds Aristotelian political science to be less than the whole truth about politics: it is the kind of political science that emerges out of political life rather than from philosophy. In turn, for Arendt the capacity to judge, the ability to see things not only from one's own point of view is the only political capacity that allows us to orient ourselves in public realm. The Greeks, writes Arendt, called this ability phronesis, or insight, and they considered it the principal virtue or excellence of the statesman in distinction from the wisdom of the philosopher. The difference between this judging insight and speculative thought lies in that the former has its roots in what we usually call common sense, which the latter constantly transcends.
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion / filozófia, pszichológia, vallás > B1 Philosophy (General) / filozófia általában J Political Science / politológia > JA Political science (General) / politológia általában |
Depositing User: | PhD Márton Attila Demeter |
Date Deposited: | 24 Sep 2018 10:14 |
Last Modified: | 31 Mar 2023 11:31 |
URI: | http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/85101 |
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